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The uncanny valley posits that very human-like robots are unsettling, a phenomenon amply demonstrated in
adults but unexplored in children. Two hundred forty 3- to 18-year-olds viewed one of two robots (machine-
like or very human-like) and rated their feelings toward (e.g., “Does the robot make you feel weird or
happy?”) and perceptions of the robot’s capacities (e.g., “Does the robot think for itself?”). Like adults, chil-
dren older than 9 judged the human-like robot as creepier than the machine-like robot—but younger children
did not. Children’s perceptions of robots’ mental capacities predicted uncanny feelings: children judge robots
to be creepy depending on whether they have human-like minds. The uncanny valley is therefore acquired
over development and relates to changing conceptions about robot minds.
All day, every day, both children and adults try to
get inside the minds of others, wondering about
their thoughts, feelings, and intentions. Until the
past few decades, these minds have been those of
flesh and blood—humans and animals—but now
we are faced with minds made of metal and silicon,
including smart phones and cloud computing. How
do we learn to make sense of these artificial minds?
Nowhere is this question more pressing than
with robots, who have self-directed mechanical
minds dwelling inside human-like bodies. The
National Robotics Initiative foresees a future in
which “robots are as commonplace as today’s auto-
mobiles, computers, and cell phones. Robots will be
found in homes, offices, hospitals, factories, farms,
and mines; and in the air, on land, under water,
and in space” (National Robotics Initiative 2.0:
Ubiquitous Collaborative Robots (NRI-2.0; 2017). In
fact, robots are already entering homes, not only to
help adults with household chores, but also to play
with and teach children. Moreover, several robots
have been working with children in classrooms,
day cares, clinics, and hospitals for years. Robots
are teaching children language skills (Movellan,
Eckhardt, Virnes, & Rodriguez, 2009), mathematics
(Wei, Hung, Lee, & Chen, 2011), science (Hashi-
moto, Kobayashi, Polishuk, & Verner, 2013), physi-
cal exercises (Mejıas et al., 2013), and even social
skills (Ricks & Colton, 2010). Dozens of robots have
been released in the past year alone designed
specifically to interact with children. As robots
become increasingly present in our lives and the
lives of our children, it becomes more and more
important to explore how we reason about the
minds of these devices and how this reasoning
impacts our interactions and feelings toward them.
Work with adults has identified one phe-
nomenon, in particular, that could shed light on
this topic. Specifically, decades of research reveal
that while adults prefer robots that are somewhat
human like, they find very human-like robots
unnerving—the “uncanny valley” phenomenon
(MacDorman, Green, Ho, & Koch, 2009; Mori,
MacDorman, & Kageki, 2012). According to theories
of the uncanny valley, machines become increas-
ingly attractive as they become more human like
until they reach a threshold at which they become
too human like and are considered uncanny and
creepy (see Figure 1). This dip in affinity for very
human-like robots is the uncanny valley. Closely
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human-like robots are distinctly creepier than other
robots and, in particular, creepier than the more
unsettling of machine-like robots. Support for the
uncanny valley comes from many studies in which
adults report feeling greater unease when presented
with extremely human-like robots compared to
others (Gray & Wegner, 2012; MacDorman, 2006).
Two theories have been proposed to explain the
uncanny valley’s origins. One references innate evo-
lutionary concerns (Steckenfinger & Ghazanfar,
2009), including the innate drive to avoid illness.
Human-like robots may display “visual defects”
that are interpreted as signs of a “communicable
disease” thus producing a creepy response. Alterna-
tively, innate face-processing mechanisms may rec-
ognize visual defects in very human-like faces
compared to real human faces and thus process
those faces as unattractive and creepy. Various
facial processing mechanisms and standards are in
fact apparent even in infants (see Langlois, Rog-
gman, & Rieser-Danner, 1990 for evidence that
infants prefer attractive faces). This evolutionary
account receives further support from research
demonstrating that even monkeys experience an
uncanny valley when viewing computer-simulated
images of monkey faces (Steckenfinger & Ghazan-
far, 2009).
An alternative theory proposes that for humans
the uncanny valley is not simply a by-product of
evolutionary perceptual responses, but instead
depends on an acquired everyday understanding of
what makes humans distinct from machines
(MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006). Feelings of uncan-
niness may instead emerge when a human-like
machine violates our learned expectations of how a
machine should look or behave. In the case of
robots, for example, when a machine closely resem-
bles a thinking and feeling human being, this
would violate our expectations that machines
should be inanimate and hence incapable of
thought and experience. Specifically, a very human-
like appearance in a machine can prompt attribu-
tions of a human-like mind (Epley, Waytz, &
Cacioppo, 2007), and as human-like minds are sel-
dom ascribed to robots (Gray, Gray, & Wegner,
2007), this mismatch causes feelings of uncanniness
(Gray & Wegner, 2012). Indeed, research with
adults reveals that the more robots are seen to have
human feelings, the more unnerving they seem
(Gray & Wegner, 2012). Violations of expectations
about the behavior and appearance of machines
and humans thus link to the uncanny valley
phenomenon in adults.
While the uncanny valley has been studied in
adults, its origins have never been studied in children.
If evolutionary in nature, the uncanny valley should
be evident in even the youngest children. However, if
it is related to developing expectations about humans
and machines, then it should emerge throughout
childhood—perhaps in tandemwith exclusive attribu-
tions of human-like minds to humans. As the origins
and mechanisms of the uncanny valley have yet to be
tested in children, we examine them here.
We offer a detailed look at the uncanny valley
across development by measuring uncanny
responses to videos of robots in children from ages
3 to 18. We used stimuli previously validated with
adults (Gray & Wegner, 2012): videos of the same
robot that revealed either its machine-like or
human-like nature (see Figure 2). We showed these
videos to children and then assessed their feelings
of creepiness and also their attributions of mind—
thinking (agency) and feeling (experience)—toward
the robots. By assessing feelings of unease and
mind attribution across a large age range, we could
detect whether (and when) the uncanny valley
develops, and its potential link to children’s under-
standings of robot minds.
We expected one of three possible patterns
would likely appear: (a) the uncanny valley would
be present at even the youngest ages, offering
support for the evolutionary perspective. (b) The
uncanny valley would emerge in early childhood in
tandem with general perceptions of mind—offering
C
Figure 1. A schematic depiction of the theoretical uncanny valley
(figure closely derived from figure 2 in Mori et al., 2012). The
uncanny valley is defined as the precipitous dip in affinity for
closely human-like robots. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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support for the developmental perspective. (c) The
uncanny valley would emerge in later childhood,
when children develop more sophisticated—and
specific—understandings of the different kinds of
minds possessed by machines, also supporting a
developmental perspective.
The evolutionary perspective suggests that even
the youngest children should find human-like
robots more unnerving than machine-like robots, ir-
respective of attributions of mind. On the other hand,
the developmental perspective suggests that the
uncanny valley will emerge in childhood, perhaps
even early childhood, when children have begun
distinguishing humans (and human minds) from
other categories. Theory-of-mind research shows
that 3- to 5-year-olds become quickly adept at
attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires to
humans (see meta-analyses by Milligan, Astington, &
Dack, 2007; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). This
too might predict that the uncanny valley would be
evident in our youngest age group. However, this
possibility could, nonetheless, be distinguished from
the evolutionary one if the presence of uncanny valley
responses in early childhood is related to children’s
attributions of mind.
Alternatively, the uncanny valley could instead
arise around middle childhood—when children
develop richer understandings of folk biology and
folk psychology, and begin to separate the concepts
of minds, brains, bodies, and machines (Wellman,
2014). For example, it is only at about 9–12 years
that children truly understand differences between
the mind (as more “mental”) and the brain (as
more part of the biological body; Johnson & Well-
man, 1982; Richert & Harris, 2006). This under-
standing that the mind stems from the biological
brain (i.e., a neurophysiological “machine”) could
support the development of the uncanny valley:
The uncanny valley may result from the mismatch
of perceiving a human mind as stemming from a
machine brain. Indeed, post preschool children, as
they age, expect machines to have fewer mental
abilities (Kahn et al., 2012, which examined children
ages 9–15). It may not be until this later age that
children develop an understanding that robots, as
machines, should not have minds as humans do,




Two hundred forty children (117 females),
3–18 years old, were recruited from a local natural
history museum (218 children) or from a participant
database (12 children) between March 2015 and
June 2016. Children were questioned in a semi-
isolated, quiet space within the museum or (for 12)
in an on-campus laboratory space. One child was
excluded due to incorrect parental report of their
birthdate. Our sample was twice the number of
participants (N = 120) used in a similar previous
task (Gray & Wegner, 2012, study 1). Power analy-
ses indicate that N = 240 exceeds .80 statistical
power (Cohen, 1988).
Because data were collected in a public space,
we did not collect information regarding children’s
race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status. Written
parental consent and verbal child assent were
obtained first; children received a small toy for par-
ticipating.
Videos
Children were randomly assigned to watch short
videos of either a closely human-like robot or a
more machine-like robot (Figure 2), the two used in
Gray and Wegner (2012). For the human-like robot,
119 children watched 16s of Kaspar moving its
Figure 2. Still frames from the videos of each robot: Kaspar from the back (left panel), Kaspar from the front (center panel), and Nao
(right panel). [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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head, filmed from the front with its human-like face
clearly visible. In the machine-like robot condition,
120 children watched 16s of the robot Kaspar mov-
ing its head while filmed from behind, where only
its wiring and electrical components could be seen,
no human-like features were visible. Respondents
could not infer that these views were of the same
robot because (paralleling Gray & Wegner, 2012)
these videos were presented between subjects. This
focal comparison controls for many irrelevant dif-
ferences between the human-like and machine-like
robots because the videos contain the same robot
making the same movement but from different
views (front vs. back).
Although our focal contrast compares the
human-like and machine-like versions of Kaspar,
we also included a video of Nao—a commercially
available abstractly humanoid robot—as a baseline
condition (see Figure 2). We filmed Nao to mimic
the human-like robot—only head, face, and torso
visible, moving its head from side to side, with no
changes in expression. After viewing either the
machine-like robot or human-like robot, 234 chil-
dren watched the 16s video of Nao. We imple-
mented this baseline condition using Nao as one
indicator that children used our rating scale and
terms appropriately (see following).
Nao has been used in previous studies with chil-
dren (4–9 years) to effectively comfort them during
stressful events (e.g., receiving a vaccination; Beran,
Ramirez-Serrano, Vanderkooi, & Kuhn, 2013) and so
is presumably not creepy or uncanny. Nao is also
unlikely to be considered creepy because it resem-
bles the friendly, animated robot protagonists por-
trayed in children’s films like WALLE (Stanton,
2008) and Baymax in Big Hero 6 (Hall & Williams,
2014). Thus, if children appropriately use our scale,
they should provide low ratings of uncanniness for
Nao. Although we expect that Nao should be rated
low on feelings of uncanniness, we did not use Nao
as an indicator of the presence or absence of the
uncanny valley. First, Nao has never been empiri-
cally placed on the hypothesized uncanny valley
gradient. Moreover, a contrast between Nao and the
very human-like robot would be insufficient evi-
dence to prove the existence of the uncanny valley.
The uncanny valley is more specifically defined as
the dip in affinity when very human-like robots are
perceived as creepier than even somewhat creepy
machine-like robots. Finding that a very human-like
robot (Kaspar from the front) is creepier than a not
very creepy, and even comforting, humanoid robot
(Nao) would not sufficiently demonstrate the pres-
ence or absence of the uncanny valley.
Task and Design
After viewing each robot (machine-like or very
human-like, then Nao), children answered multiple
questions presented in a two-part format. In the
first part, children chose one of two options. For
example, when asked “Does the robot think for
itself?,” children answered either yes or no verbally
or by pointing to a “thumbs up” (yes) or a “thumbs
down” (no) card (see Figure 3). If children
answered yes, they then answered a second Likert-
type scale question. For example, “How much does
the robot think for itself?”: “a little bit,” “a medium
amount,” or “a lot.” Children could answer ver-
bally or by indicating on a scale with increasingly
tall bars (see Figure 3).
Robot Beliefs Interview
Children were assessed on their feelings of
uncanniness via two questions gauging the extent
to which children felt the robot was creepy or
unsettling: (a) “Do you feel the robot is nice or
creepy?” If children reported the robot was creepy,
we asked, “How creepy do you feel it is?” (b)
“Does the robot make you feel weird or happy?”
and “How weird does it make you feel?” This ques-
tion format resulted in a 4-point scale for each
question coded as 0 (nice/happy), 1 (creepy/weird—a
little bit), 2 (creepy/weird—a medium amount), and 3
(creepy/weird—a lot).
Then children answered 11 additional questions,
10 of them addressing the robots’ mental capacities
(adapted from Gray et al., 2007; Severson & Lemm,
2016; see Appendix for complete interview). Previ-
ous interviews with adults have identified compo-
nents of mental capacity labeled “agency” and
“experience.” Questions were designed to encom-
pass similar factors in our sample: psychological
agency (does the robot “do things on purpose?,”
“choose to move?,” “think for itself?,” and “know
the difference between good and bad?”) and per-
ceptual experience (would the robot “feel pain?,”
“feel scared?,” and “feel hungry?”). The same two-
part question format resulted in a 4-point scale for
each of these “mind” questions coded as 0 (no), 1
(yes—a little bit), 2 (yes—a medium amount), and 3
(yes—a lot).
Procedure
Children were instructed that they would view
videos of robots and answer questions about them.
Children then answered three warm-up questions
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and were randomly assigned to watch a video of
either the closely human-like or machine-like robot
on an iPad. After watching the video, children com-
pleted the Robot Beliefs Interview. The video was
paused so that a still frame of the robot was visible
during the interview. Upon completion of the inter-
view, children watched a video of Nao and per-
formed the Robot Beliefs Interview once more for




It was unclear whether children’s perceptions
and feelings toward robots would reveal the same
factor structure as past work with adults, so we
performed an exploratory factor analysis separately
for each of the two conditions (very human like
and machine like). Using an oblique rotation, Kai-
ser’s criterion (eigenvalues ≥ 1), a scree plot, and
model fit indices (Preacher & MacCallum, 2003),
three factors were identified: uncanniness (machine
like: a = .62, human like: a = .75), agency (a = .72,
.64), and experience (a = .73, .85). Five additional
items were pruned (see Appendix) that had low
factor loadings, cross-loaded on to multiple factors,
or were not easily interpretable; these items were
not included in the final factor analysis.
As shown in Table 1, the three factors (covering
eight items)—uncanniness, agency, and experience
—had identical factor structures across the two
conditions (very human like and machine like) and
provided high overall fit. Table 1 reveals that all
items had a loading of at least .40 on their respec-
tive factors. Model fit indices also support the
three-factor solution within each condition. For the
machine-like condition, chi-square goodness of fit,
v2(7) = 3.64, p = .82, root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA) = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.07],
and Tucker Lewis index (TLI) = 1.07, were all
within their established cutoff ranges (Hu & Ben-
tler, 1999). For the human-like condition, model fit
indices approximated or were within established cut-
off ranges: chi-square goodness of fit, v2(7) = 10.53,
p = .16, RMSEA = 0.07, 90% CI [0.00, 0.14], and
TLI = 0.953. Cronbach’s a ranged from .62 to .85
across all three factors and both conditions.
Attributions of Mind Score
Agency was measured by averaging the items
“does the robot choose to move?,” “think for
itself?,” and “know the difference between good
and bad?” Thought, decision making, and morality
have been linked to psychological agency for adults
(Gray et al., 2007). Experience was measured by
averaging the items: “would the robot feel pain?,”
“feel scared?,” and “feel hungry?.” These items also
resembled those for perceptual experience in adult
research (Gray et al., 2007). The aggregates for
agency and experience were highly correlated,
r(236) = .49. Thus, for conceptual reasons and to
avoid issues of multicollinearity, agency and experi-
ence were averaged to create a composite measure
Figure 3. Images that were shown to children to aid them in answering the two-part survey questions: thumbs up (yes), thumbs down
(no), and a scale with bars increasing in height (“a little bit,” “a medium amount,” or “a lot”). These exact depictions were taken from
Severson and Lemm (2016).
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of attributions of mind. This approach has also been
used in the adult literature (see Gray, Knickman, &
Wegner, 2011).
Uncanniness Difference Scores
To account for individual differences in chil-
dren’s use of the scale, the dependent variable of
uncanniness was converted to a difference score.
This difference score was calculated by subtracting
the uncanniness score for the baseline condition,
Nao, from the uncanniness score for the focal robot
that a child viewed. For example, for children that
viewed the human-like robot, their uncanniness
score for Nao was subtracted from their uncanni-
ness score for the human-like robot. This difference
score allows the comparison between our focal two
robots to be individualized to the extent that we
use Nao as a baseline, anchoring the score of the
focal robots on an empirically verified comforting
robot, Nao (Beran et al., 2013). This score thus also
provides a control for children’s unfamiliarity with
robots in general which can vary from child to
child and age to age (see Dalecki & Willits, 1991 for
an explanation and justification of the statistical
advantages of such comparisons). We did not use
Nao as a regressor in our subsequent regression
analyses because preliminary analyses showed that
feelings of uncanniness for Nao did not signifi-
cantly predict feelings of uncanniness for the focal
robots. Uncanniness difference scores will be
referred to as uncanniness scores.
Results
The Development of the Uncanny Valley
Attributions of mind, robot type (very human
like vs. machine like), and age as well as interac-
tions between mind and age, and robot and age
were entered into a regression analysis predicting
uncanniness scores. As shown in Table 2, there
were significant associations between uncanniness
scores and attributions of mind and robot type,
qualified by the interaction between attributions of
mind and age and the interaction between robot
type and age. There was no main effect of age.
The interaction between robot type and age indi-
cates that the uncanny valley develops. The positive
interaction indicates that as children age, the
human-like robot is perceived as increasingly cree-
pier than the machine-like robot. A plot of the inter-
action can be seen in Figure 4. Tests of simple
slopes indicated that the human-like robot does not
become creepier than the machine-like robot until
Table 1




Do you feel the
robot is creepy?








.08, .10 .59, .69 .06, .07
Does the robot
think for itself?
.01, .04 .77, .53 .04, .34




.14, .10 .66, .47 .02, .08
Would the robot
feel pain?
.03, .02 .02, .04 .93, .86
Would the robot
feel scared?
.01, 03 .27, .03 .40, .82
Would the robot
feel hungry?
.03, .09 .27, .06 .51, .76
a .62, .75 .72, .64 .73, .85
Note. Using an oblique rotation, Kaiser’s criterion (eigenval-
ues ≥ 1), a scree plot, and model fit indices, three factors were
identified. The first nine rows represent the factor loadings for
each item and in the bottom row, the a values for each factor.
Bolded numbers identify the items that were used to calculate
the aggregates for their respective factors. The first number in
each cell represents values for the machine-like robot and the
second for the human-like robot, respectively (as indicated by
the two numbers in each column).
Table 2
Regression Analyses Predicting Uncanniness Difference Scores
Estimate SE b t p
Human-like robot .32 .15 .14 2.10 .037*
Mind .25 .11 .21 2.31 .022*
Age .23 .14 .20 1.68 .094
Human-Like
Robot 9 Age
.32 .15 .13 2.08 .039*
Mind 9 Age .20 .10 .17 2.04 .043*
Intercept .89 .12 7.41 < .0001****
Note. Robot type, attributions of mind, the child’s age, and two
interaction terms were entered into a regression analysis to pre-
dict uncanniness difference scores. Attributions of mind and age
were centered. Robot type, attributions of mind, the interaction
between robot type and age, and the interaction between attribu-
tions of mind and age all predicted reports of uncanniness,
R2 = .12.
*p < .05. ****p < .0001.
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approximately 9 years of age. Before 9 years of age,
robot type did not predict feelings of uncanniness
(i.e., both the human-like and machine-like robots
were equally creepy): at age 4, b = .08, p = .57
and at age 8, b = .13, p = .11. At 9 years, however,
the uncanny valley effect emerges with robot type
significantly predicting uncanniness, b = .18,
p = .02, where the human-like robot is significantly
more uncanny than the machine-like robot. The
uncanniness of human-like robots relative to
machine-like robots continues to increase up to
16 years, b = .55, p = .002.
Uncanniness and Mind
The development of the uncanny valley is also
linked to attributions of mind, shown by the signifi-
cant interaction between attributions of mind and
age on uncanniness scores (as shown in Table 2).
This interaction indicates that, as children get older,
the association between attributions of mind and
feelings of uncanniness changes. Specifically, tests
of simple slopes show that, in young children,
increased attributions of mind tend to predict de-
creased feelings of uncanniness in young children:
For children ages 4–9, attributions of mind nega-
tively correlated with the uncanny response—at
4 years, b = .55, p < .001, and at 9 years,
b = .23, p = .04. For older children (ages 10–18),
this negative correlation started to disappear and
began to trend positive, although not significantly
so—at 10 years, b = .16, p = .21, and at 16 years,
b = .23, p = .42. The upper age limit of our sample,
however, had fewer participants and therefore less
power to test for a statistically positive association.
This descriptively positive trend at the oldest range
of our child sample fits qualitatively with findings
in the adult literature in which feelings of uncanni-
ness become positively associated with attributions
of mind (Gray & Wegner, 2012). In total, this signif-
icant interaction suggests that the emergence of the
uncanny valley is associated with children’s percep-
tions of mind, particularly for younger children.
Uncanniness Responses for Nao
Figure 5 shows the raw scores for feelings of
uncanniness for all three robots. Inspection of this
figure shows that Nao was consistently rated low
on uncanniness across all ages in our sample. A
regression analysis predicting raw uncanniness
scores while controlling for age and comparing Nao
with the least creepy of the two focal robots, the
machine-like robot, showed that Nao is less creepy
than the machine-like robot, b = .82, t(110) =
9.34, p < .0001. Nao is also less creepy than the
closely human-like robot, b = 1.05, t(111) =
11.58, p < .0001. Statistically, appropriate baseline
conditions should have low, stable scores on the
variable of interest, thus dispelling the possibility of
a yes bias. Our expectation for Nao to be minimally
uncanny (as explained earlier) was thus confirmed
empirically, a result that supports its use as a base-
line condition for creating uncanniness difference
scores. Furthermore, raw uncanniness scores for
Nao did not differ between children who first
saw the human-like (M = 1.31, SD = 0.67) or
the machine-like robot (M = 1.36, SD = 0.69),
t(224.25) = 0.53, p = .59, 95% CI [0.23, 0.13].
Because the robot that children saw first did not
impact their responses to Nao, this provides addi-
tional empirical justification for its use as a baseline
condition.
Appropriate Understanding of “Creepy” and “Weird”
Methodologically, the comparison between Nao
and the other robots shows that even the youngest
children respond to our uncanny valley questions
and test format with varied answers across the con-
ditions, indicating that they offered meaningfully
Figure 4. The interaction between robot type and age, b = .13,
t(223) = 2.08, p = .04, shows that the uncanny valley develops.
The positive interaction indicates that as children get older
the human-like robot becomes increasingly creepier than the
machine-like robot, as shown here. The development of the
uncanny valley effect is demonstrated by the increasing distance
between the two lines (machine like vs. human like) with age.
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differential responses; children did not merely
demonstrate a yes bias to our scale. Although their
uncanny ratings, based on use of the terms
“creepy” and “weird,” do not distinguish the
machine-like and the human-like robots, they do
distinguish between Nao and these two.
For further confirmation of their understanding
of these two key terms, we tested a separate sample
of 20 young children on their understanding of the
terms “weird” and “creepy” via a brief interview.
These children came from the same local popula-
tion as those in our main study and were equiva-
lent in age to children at the lower end of the age
range in our sample (M = 3.40 years, SD = 0.34,
range = 3.01–3.99). These children were presented
with two paired images of a typical toy (i.e., a
stuffed giraffe or tricycle) and a clearly strange toy
(toys modeled after the creepy/weird toys in toy
story; Lasseter, 1995) shown in Figure 6. For one
pair, children were asked to select which toy was
creepy and, for the other pair, which toy made
them feel weird (see questions in Figure 6). On
these tasks, 95% of these young children appropri-
ately chose the strange toy as creepy and 85% chose
the other strange toy as making them feel weird.
Overall children were 90% correct on these items
that used terms and phrasing closely similar to
those in the two items that constituted our uncanny
index. Thus, even children at our youngest age are
capable of appropriately using the two words nec-
essary for meaningfully employing our uncanny
rating scale.
Discussion
We provide three novel findings. First, the uncanny
valley develops: Younger children found the closely
human-like and machine-like robots equally not
very creepy, whereas older children found the clo-
sely human-like robot much creepier than the
machine-like robot—similar to adults. Second, we
identified the approximate age at which the
uncanny valley emerges. Differences in feelings
about the two focal robots emerged progressively
over age, but it was not until middle childhood that
children had a greater uncanny response to a clo-
sely human-like robot than a contrasting machine-
like robot. Third, children’s perceptions of mind
were correlated with this change in uncanny
responses. For younger children, increasing percep-
tions of mind predicted decreased uncanniness. For
older children, this association trended in the
reverse direction, though not significantly so. Thus,
from younger children to older children, the corre-
lation between mind and feelings of uncanniness
Figure 5. Measure of uncanniness, the aggregate of the two questions that measured whether children perceived the robot to be creepy
or weird, for each of the three robots: the machine-like robot (Kaspar from the back), the human-like robot (Kaspar from the front), and
Nao. Error bars represent standard errors.
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increases from negative to trending positive, and
the broader literature indicates that this correlation
continues to increase and becomes positive for
adults (Gray & Wegner, 2012). Of course, caution is
needed in such cross-study child–adult comparisons
(even though our videos for the Kaspars are exactly
those used by Gray & Wegner, 2012). Regardless,
we clearly demonstrate that feelings of uncanniness
emerge and change over childhood, and are associ-
ated with differing perceptions of robots’ minds.
This research addresses important questions in
psychology and robotics by providing initial evi-
dence on the origins of the uncanny valley. One
theory suggests that the uncanny valley is
grounded in an innate mechanism (Steckenfinger &
Ghazanfar, 2009), which means it should be present
at an early age. Indeed, a priori, it is easy to imag-
ine that young children could have responded to
human-like robots as adults do—perceiving them
as creepy. However, our results suggest that the
uncanny valley emerges through development, and
tracks changing understandings of mind. Our
results clearly show that only children 9 years and
older—those who have clear expectations about
human and robot minds—feel unease toward very
human-like robots, consistent with the second
hypothesis outlined in the introduction that a robot
is considered creepy when it violates our learned
expectations of how a machine should look or
behave.
The absence of the uncanny valley in younger
children may reflect that they expect robots to have
a myriad of mental abilities. In fact, other research
on children’s understanding of robots supports this
speculation. Young children report that robots have
perceptual abilities, like sight and touch: 3-year-olds
claimed that a robot dog could see and be tickled
(Jipson & Gelman, 2007). In conversations with par-
ents, 3- to 5-year-olds also attributed biological,
psychological, and sensory abilities, in addition to
features of artifacts, to a robot dog (Jipson, G€ulg€oz,
& Gelman, 2016). As young children seemingly
expect some robots to have mental abilities, the per-
ception of a human-like mind may be a welcome
familiarity for them. Indeed, our results are consis-
tent with this explanation: Young children found
robots to be more pleasing (less uncanny) when
they perceived the robots to have more mental abil-
ities.
Older children, on the other hand, seemingly
have different expectations about robot minds and
expect robots to have reduced mental capacities.
Figure 6. Stimuli used for follow-up interview to address whether children appropriately understood the words “creepy” and “weird.”
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Five-year-olds are less likely to claim that a robot
dog could think or feel happy compared to 3-year-
olds (Jipson & Gelman, 2007) and are less likely to
report that a robot has emotions, desires, or is cap-
able of autonomous action (Mikropoulos, Misailidi,
& Bonoti, 2003). Fifteen-year-olds were also less
likely to believe that the robot Robovie could have
interests, experience emotions, or be a friend com-
pared to 9- and 12-year-olds (Kahn et al., 2012).
These changes in expectations with age have been
linked to children’s increasing experiences with and
growing knowledge of technological devices (Bern-
stein & Crowley, 2008). Although the ages and
robots varied across these studies, the general trend
is clear: with age, children begin to deny psycho-
logical, emotional, social, and perceptual abilities to
robots. For our older children, judgments of mind
were no longer negatively associated with their rat-
ings of uncanniness: attributions of mind stopped
predicting a decrease in feelings of uncanniness. By
hypothesis, older children in our sample may have
evidenced an uncanny response to the human-like
robot due to emerging changes in their expectations
about the mental abilities of robots.
Our research was exploratory in the sense that,
in advance of collecting the needed, relevant data,
we had no firm prediction for which of various
developmental patterns might emerge. Although
exploratory, our results clearly demonstrate that the
uncanny valley effect develops with age, and that it
occurs in tandem with judgments of mind.
Questions about the uncanny valley and children
will become only more important over time as
more robots are being made to interact and play
with children. iPal, Jibo, and Zenbo, three Pixar-like
robots, are designed to play games, answer ques-
tions, read stories, and watch children unsupervised
(Glaser, 2016; Low, 2016; Wong, 2016). Nao, Ursus
(a robotic bear), and Kaspar are all robots used to
teach typically developing children, and those with
motor disorders and autism spectrum disorders, a
variety of skills including language (Movellan et al.,
2009), physical exercises (Mejıas et al., 2013), and
social skills (Ricks & Colton, 2010). We should
likely ensure that children, both typically develop-
ing and those with special needs, actually like these
robots before extensively using them as companions
or teachers.
While our research speaks to important avenues
for future research, there are noteworthy potential
limitations to our study. First, we acknowledge that
our data are only correlational—unlike some work
with adults (Gray & Wegner, 2012), there is no cau-
sal evidence for the link between understandings of
mind and the uncanny valley in childhood. Future
studies should therefore more explicitly test devel-
opments in thinking about minds (and machines)
more generally with the development of the
uncanny valley. This could involve both experi-
ments and longitudinal studies that track children’s
developing concepts of minds and machines (Gel-
man, 2003).
Second, for older children, judgments of uncanni-
ness became dissociated with attributions of mind;
for them, that link was no longer statistically signif-
icant. Although at first glance this result may seem
problematic, a clear developmental picture emerges
when these childhood data are coupled with data
from adults in prior studies: The correlation
between mind and uncanniness increases over age
from young (negative, i.e., increasing attributions of
mind predict decreased feelings of uncanniness) to
middle (zero) to older (trend positive) children and
to adults (positive). On the other hand, it is also
still possible that significant positive links between
uncanniness and mind (increasing attributions of
mind predict increased feelings of uncanniness)
appear in middle to late childhood, in advance of
adulthood. In order to be child friendly, our scale
for uncanniness had a restricted range (e.g., allow-
ing three degrees of creepiness and feeling weird)
in comparison with scales for adults, and it may be
that a more nuanced scale would reveal similar
effects to those with adults. A direction for future
research would be to look further at participants
aged 10 to adulthood but with a revised rating
scale to assess the development of a positive associ-
ation between mind and uncanniness in later child-
hood.
Third, our results do not speak to degrees of the
uncanny valley, as we used a binary comparison
for machine-like and very human-like robots (con-
sistent with Gray & Wegner, 2012). The classic
uncanny valley proposal is that liking of robots fol-
lows a nonlinear curve (Mori et al., 2012) as in Fig-
ure 1, and future research with children should
explore the full range of its trajectory. Still, our
study provides three initial data points on this tra-
jectory: a machine-like robot, an anthropomor-
phized robot, and a human-like robot. Although
our study design (being a mix of within and
between subjects) complicates the analysis of these
three robot types somewhat, we can descriptively
say that the anthropomorphic robot (Nao) was the
least uncanny, followed by the machine-like robot,
and finally the human-like robot as most uncanny.
It is moreover extremely likely that “humanness”
is more than just a single dimension, thus plausibly
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robots could be human like in several different mul-
tidimensional ways. Robots could be closely human
like in face, limbs, behavior, language, and more.
Future research should investigate which of these
features of human likeness is considered creepy
and at what ages. And given our data, an impor-
tant question would be which features are tied to
mind? Future research examining a larger variety of
robots across childhood is clearly needed.
Fourth, one might argue that our results do not
speak to children’s changing perceptions of robots,
but instead their developing understanding of
words such as “weird,” “feel,” or “think.” Our
results with Nao, however, coupled with our addi-
tional data on young children’s appropriate under-
standing of “weird” and “creepy” speak against
this. Ample research also demonstrates that even
preschoolers have appropriate understanding of the
terms used in our questions eliciting children’s attri-
butions of mind, such as “think,” “know,” “feel,”
and “on purpose” (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).
Such findings make it difficult to argue that chil-
dren have only shifted their understanding of the
key words—creepy, weird, think, etc.—and are
much more consistent with children appropriately
using these terms to convey their developing con-
ceptions of robots and robotic uncanniness and
mind.
Understanding the development of the uncanny
valley as an outgrowth of children’s basic assump-
tions about robots coupled with increasing insights
into minds provides a new perspective on this
important phenomenon—it also suggests that one
day the uncanny valley may disappear. As human-
like robots become more commonplace and expand
their abilities, children may come to expect that
robots, although machines, can look surprisingly
human, and do have minds, encompassing at least
some human-like experiences. At which point, even
highly human-like robots may be comfortingly
familiar to children—even as they continue to
unnerve today’s adults.
References
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. M. (1995). Children talk about
the mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Beran, T. N., Ramirez-Serrano, A., Vanderkooi, O. G., &
Kuhn, S. (2013). Reducing children’s pain and distress
towards flu vaccinations: A novel and effective applica-
tion of humanoid robotics. Vaccine, 31, 2772–2777.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2013.03.056
Bernstein, D., & Crowley, K. (2008). Searching for signs of
intelligent life: An investigation of young children’s
beliefs about robot intelligence. The Journal of the Learn-
ing Sciences, 17, 225–247. https://doi.org/10.1080/
10508400801986116
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the social
sciences, 2nd ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum
Associates.
Dalecki, M., & Willits, F. K. (1991). Examining change
using regression analysis: Three approaches compared.
Sociological Spectrum, 11, 127–145. https://doi.org/10.
1080/02732173.1991.9981960
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing
human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism.
Psychological Review, 114, 864. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0033-295X.114.4.864
Gelman, S. A. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essen-
tialism in everyday thought. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Glaser, A. (2016). Jibo is like Alexa and a puppy inside one
adorable robot. Retrieved from http://www.wired.
com/2016/06/jibo-like-alexa-puppy-inside-one-adorable-
robot/
Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Dimen-
sions of mind perception. Science, 315, 619. https://doi.
org/10.1126/science.1134475
Gray, K., Knickman, T. A., & Wegner, D. M. (2011). More
dead than dead: Perceptions of persons in the persis-
tent vegetative state. Cognition, 121, 275–280. https://d
oi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.014
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2012). Feeling robots and
human zombies: Mind perception and the uncanny val-
ley. Cognition, 125, 125–130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.c
ognition.2012.06.007
Hall, D., & Williams, C. (Writers). (2014). Big Hero 6
[Motion Picture]. United States: Walt Disney Studios
Motion Pictures.
Hashimoto, T., Kobayashi, H., Polishuk, A., & Verner, I.
(2013). Elementary science lesson delivered by robot. Paper pre-
sented at the Proceedings of the 8th ACM/IEEE interna-
tional conference on Human-robot interaction, Tokyo,
Japan.
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit
indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional
criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation
Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 6, 1–55. https://d
oi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118
Jipson, J. L., & Gelman, S. A. (2007). Robots and rodents:
Children’s inferences about living and nonliving kinds.
Child Development, 78, 1675–1688. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01095.x
Jipson, J. L., G€ulg€oz, S., & Gelman, S. A. (2016). Parent–
child conversations regarding the ontological status of
a robotic dog. Cognitive Development, 39, 21–35.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.03.001
Johnson, C. N., & Wellman, H. M. (1982). Children’s devel-
oping conceptions of the mind and brain. Child Develop-
ment, 53, 222–234. https://doi.org/10.2307/1129656
Kahn, P. H., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., Freier, N. G., Sever-
son, R. L., Gill, B. T., & Shen, S. (2012). “Robovie, you’ll
1212 Brink, Gray, and Wellman
have to go into the closet now”: Children’s social and
moral relationships with a humanoid robot. Develop-
mental Psychology, 48, 303–314. https://doi.org/10.
1037/a0027033
Langlois, J. H., Roggman, L. A., & Rieser-Danner, L. A.
(1990). Infants’ differential social responses to attractive
and unattractive faces. Developmental Psychology, 26,
153. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.26.1.153
Lasseter, J. (Writer). (1995). Toy Story [Motion Picture].
United States: Buena Vista Pictures.
Low, A. (2016). Asus’ adorable Zenbo home robot will be
released in 9 to 12 months. Retrieved from http://
www.cnet.com/news/asus-zenbo-will-only-be-released-
in-9-12-months/
MacDorman, K. F. (2006). Subjective ratings of robot video
clips for human likeness, familiarity, and eeriness: An explo-
ration of the uncanny valley. Paper presented at the
ICCS/CogSci-2006 Long Symposium: Toward social
mechanisms of android science, Vancouver, BC.
MacDorman, K. F., Green, R. D., Ho, C.-C., & Koch, C. T.
(2009). Too real for comfort? Uncanny responses to com-
puter generated faces. Computers in Human Behavior, 25,
695–710. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2008.12.026
MacDorman, K. F., & Ishiguro, H. (2006). The uncanny
advantage of using androids in cognitive and social
science research. Interaction Studies, 7, 297–337.
https://doi.org/10.1075/is.7.3.03mac
Mejıas, C. S., Echevarrıa, C., Nu~nez, P., Manso, L., Bustos,
P., Leal, S., & Parra, C. (2013). Ursus: A robotic assis-
tant for training of children with motor impairments.
In J. L. Pons, D. Torricelli, & M. Pajaro (Eds.), Conver-
ging Clinical and Engineering Research on Neurorehabilita-
tion (pp. 249–253). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Mikropoulos, T., Misailidi, P., & Bonoti, F. (2003).
Attributing human properties to computer artifacts:
Developmental changes in children’s understanding of
the animate–inanimate distinction. Psychology: The Jour-
nal of the Hellenic Psychological Society, 10, 53–64.
Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007). Lan-
guage and theory of mind: Meta-analysis of the relation
between language ability and false-belief understand-
ing. Child Development, 78, 622–646. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x
Mori, M., MacDorman, K. F., & Kageki, N. (2012). The
uncanny valley [from the field]. IEEE Robotics &
Automation Magazine, 19, 98–100. https://doi.org/10.
1109/MRA.2012.2192811
Movellan, J., Eckhardt, M., Virnes, M., & Rodriguez, A.
(2009). Sociable robot improves toddler vocabulary skills.
Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 4th ACM/
IEEE international conference on Human robot interac-
tion, La Jolla, CA.
National Robotics Initiative 2.0: Ubiquitous Collaborative
Robots (NRI-2.0). (2017). Retrieved from https://www.
nsf.gov/pubs/2017/nsf17518/nsf17518.htm
Preacher, K. J., & MacCallum, R. C. (2003). Repairing
Tom Swift’s electric factor analysis machine. Under-
standing Statistics: Statistical Issues in Psychology,
Education, and the Social Sciences, 2, 13–43. https://doi.
org/10.1207/S15328031US0201_02
Richert, R. A., & Harris, P. L. (2006). The ghost in my
body: Children’s developing concept of the soul. Journal
of Cognition and Culture, 6, 409–427. https://doi.org/10.
1163/156853706778554913
Ricks, D. J., & Colton, M. B. (2010). Trends and considera-
tions in robot-assisted autism therapy. Paper presented at
the 2010 IEEE International Conference on Robotics
and Automation (ICRA), Anchorage, AK.
Severson, R. L., & Lemm, K. M. (2016). Kids see human
too: Adapting an individual differences measure of
anthropomorphism for a child sample. Journal of Cogni-
tion and Development, 17, 122–141. https://doi.org/10.
1080/15248372.2014.989445
Stanton, A. (Writer). (2008). WALLE [Motion Picture]. Uni-
ted States: Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures.
Steckenfinger, S. A., & Ghazanfar, A. A. (2009). Monkey
visual behavior falls into the uncanny valley. Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 18362–
18366. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0910063106
Wei, C.-W., Hung, I.-C., Lee, L., & Chen, N.-S. (2011).
A joyful classroom learning system with robot learning
companion for children to learn mathematics multipli-
cation. TOJET: The Turkish Online Journal of Educational
Technology, 10(2), 11–23.
Wellman, H. M. (2014). Making minds: How theory of mind
develops. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-
analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth
about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655–684.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304
Wong, J. C. (2016). “This is awful”: robot can keep
children occupied for hours without supervision. The






1. Do you like candy?
1.1. “Do you like candy?”
1.2. “How much do you like candy? A little bit,
a medium amount, or a lot?” or “How
much do you not like candy? A little bit, a
medium amount, or a lot?”
2. Do you like broccoli?
2.1. “Do you like broccoli?”
2.2. “How much do you like broccoli? A little
bit, a medium amount, or a lot?” or “How
much do you not like broccoli? A little bit, a
medium amount, or a lot?”
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3. Do you like carrots?
3.1. “Do you like carrots?”
3.2. “How much do you like carrots? A little bit,
a medium amount, or a lot?” or “How
much do you not like carrots? A little bit, a
medium amount, or a lot?”
Interview questions:
4. Do you feel the robot is nice or creepy? +
4.1. “Do you feel the robot is nice (thumbs up)
or creepy (thumbs down)?”
4.2. “How creepy do you feel it is? A little bit, a
medium amount, or a lot?”
5. Does the robot make you feel weird or
happy? +
5.1. “Does the robot make you feel weird
(thumbs down) or happy (thumbs up)?”
5.1. “How weird does it make you feel? A little
bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
6. Would you want to play with the robot?
6.1. “Would you want to play with the robot?”
6.2. “How much would you want to play with
it? A little bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
7. Can the robot do things on purpose? * ++
7.1. “Can the robot do things on purpose?”
7.2. “How much can the robot act on purpose?
A little bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
8. When the robot moves, does it choose to
move? +
8.1. “When the robot moves, does it choose to
move?”
8.2. “How many things can the robot choose to
do? A few things, a medium amount of
things, or a lot of things?”
9. Does the robot think for itself? ++
9.1. “Does the robot think for itself?”
9.2. “How much does it think for itself? A little
bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
10. Some actions are bad, like hitting. And some
actions are good, like helping. Does this robot
know the difference between good and bad? +
10.1. “Does this robot know the difference
between good and bad?”
10.2. “How much does it know the difference
between good and bad? A little bit, a med-
ium amount, or a lot?”
11. If I pinched the robot, would it feel pain? +
11.1. “If I pinched the robot, would it feel pain?”
11.2. “How much can this robot feel pain? A little
bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
12. Does the robot have feelings, like happy and
sad? * ++
12.1. “Does the robot have feelings, like happy
and sad?”
12.2. “How much does the robot have feelings? A
little bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
13. If the robot saw a snake, would it feel scared? +
13.1. “If the robot saw a snake, would it feel
scared?”
13.2. “How much can the robot feel scared? A lit-
tle bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
14. If the robot did not eat breakfast, would it
feel hungry? +
14.1. “If the robot did not eat breakfast, would it
feel hungry?”
14.2. “How much can the robot feel hungry? A
little bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
15. Is this robot like a human? *
15.1. “Is this robot like a human?”
15.2. “How much is the robot like a human? A
little bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
16. Does the robot know it’s a robot? * ++
16.1. “Does the robot know it’s a robot?”
16.2. “How much does it know it’s a robot? A lit-
tle bit, a medium amount, or a lot?”
* Item not included in final factor analysis due
to cross loading or low factor loadings.
+ Item derived from Gray and Wegner (2012)
and/or Gray et al. (2007).
++ Item derived from Severson and Lemm
(2016).
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